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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Jorge A. Mora Elizondo entered an Alford1 plea to felony injury to a child, and the 
State agreed to recommend local jail time and probation. But, at sentencing, the 
prosecutor impliedly disavowed the State’s promised sentence and breached the plea 
agreement. The district court sentenced Mr. Elizondo to five years, with two years fixed, 
and retained jurisdiction. Mr. Elizondo appeals from the district court’s judgment of 
conviction, contending State violated his due process rights by breaching the plea 
agreement. He also contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in 
Mr. Elizondo’s Appellant’s Brief. They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
                                            
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State deprive Mr. Elizondo of his right to due process when the State 
breached the plea agreement by impliedly disavowing its promised sentencing 
recommendation?  
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
five years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Elizondo, following his Alford plea to 
felony injury to a child? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The State Deprived Mr. Elizondo Of His Right To Due Process When The State 
Breached The Plea Agreement By Impliedly Disavowing Its Promised Sentencing 
Recommendation 
 
 The State argues the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement with her 
argument at sentencing. (Respt. Br., pp.4–10.) Mr. Elizondo respectfully disagrees. The 
prosecutor’s argument in this case was akin to the arguments rebuked by the Court of 
Appeals in Jones, Daubs, and Wills. In none of these cases did the prosecutor explicitly 
recommend a harsher penalty than the State’s promised sentence. State v. Jones, 139 
Idaho 299, 300–01 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 300, 301 (Ct. App. 
2004); State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 774 (Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the prosecutor 
implicitly recommended a harsher penalty through argument that conveyed a 
reservation about or lack of support for the State’s recommendation. Jones, 139 Idaho 
at 300–01, 303; Daubs, 140 Idaho at 300, 301; Wills, 140 Idaho at 774, 775–76. Thus, 
the prosecutor does not have to completely undermine the recommendation to 
constitute a breach. A “disregard of a plea agreement can be made manifest in more 
than one way.” Daubs, 140 Idaho at 301. If the prosecutor’s overall conduct is 
inconsistent with the recommendation, a breach has occurred. See Jones, 139 Idaho at 
302. That level of inconsistency or disregard occurred here. The prosecutor focused on 
the PSI recommendation, the “very serious allegations, a very disturbing set of facts,” 
and the harm to the victim. (Tr. Vol. II,2 p.12, L.17–p.14, L.4.) The prosecutor made an 
                                            
2 There are three transcripts on appeal. The transcript of the entry of plea hearing will 
be cited at Volume I, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing will be cited at Volume 
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argument “fundamentally at odds” with the State’s promised sentence for leniency. See 
Jones, 139 Idaho at 303. 
 The State also argues that the prosecutor simply talked about the facts of the 
case and logical inferences. (Resp. Br., pp.7–8.) And the State discounts Mr. Elizondo’s 
analysis of specific statements made by the prosecutor throughout her argument. 
(Resp. Br., pp.8–10.) These specific statements, however, make it eminently clear that 
this is not an argument advocating for an individual to be placed on probation. The 
prosecutor emphasized punishment, retribution, protection of society, and deterrence. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.12, L.17–p.14, L.4.) The prosecutor said nothing in support of 
rehabilitation. In fact, the prosecutor advocated for “significant jail time imposed without 
the potential for work release or even treatment release, if that was appropriate.” 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.13, Ls.5–10 (emphasis added).) This argument is incompatible with a 
recommendation for probation—the primary goal being rehabilitation. State v. Mummert, 
98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977); State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). Here, 
the prosecutor acknowledged the “bound” recommendation, but then disavowed any 
basis for probation and implicitly recommended a harsher penalty.  
 Additionally, the State has failed to meet its burden to prove harmlessness due to 
its waiver of the issue. Mr. Elizondo objected to the prosecutor’s argument at 
sentencing, thus preserving the issue for appeal. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.7–10.) If a 
constitutional violation occurs and is followed by an objection, the harmless error 
standard applies. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). Under this standard, 
                                                                                                                                            
II. The third transcript of the preliminary hearing is not relevant to this appeal and will 
not be cited herein. 
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Mr. Elizondo has the burden to establish the error, but the State has the burden to prove 
the error was harmless. Id. at 221, 227. The State must prove “beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the [sentence imposed].” Perry, 
150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Here, the 
State made no argument in its brief that the constitutional violation was harmless. (See 
Resp. Br., pp.4–10.) By failing to argue the issue, the State has waived it and cannot 
meet its burden to prove harmlessness. See State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598–99, 
600–01 (2013) (conviction vacated because the State failed to argue alleged errors 
were harmless); State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010) (“The State has not argued 
that the error was harmless. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of conviction.”); State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) (a party waives an issue by failing to present 
argument or authority). Therefore, if this Court concludes Mr. Elizondo established a 
due process violation for the State’s breach of the plea agreement, Mr. Elizondo’s 
judgment of conviction must be vacated for a new sentencing hearing. See Almaraz, 
154 Idaho at 598–99, 600–01; Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Elizondo, Following His Alford Plea To Felony 
Injury To A Child 
 
The State agrees with Mr. Elizondo’s contention that the district court erred by 
misidentifying the conduct to which Mr. Elizondo entered an Alford plea. (Resp. 
Br., pp.14–15.) The error occurred when the district court stated Mr. Elizondo committed 
felony injury to a child by “choking her by placing his hands around her neck while he 
was on top of her.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.20, Ls.5–11.) This is contrary to the Amended 
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Information, which provided that Mr. Elizondo committed the offense by “having sexual 
contact.” (R., pp.42–43.)  
Despite the error, the State argues it was harmless because the district court 
may consider uncharged conduct or dismissed charges at sentencing. (Resp. Br., p.15.) 
The district court has discretion to consider a wide range of relevant information at 
sentencing, but an abuse of discretion occurs when the district court misunderstands 
the nature of the offense.  
A sentencing judge may properly conduct an inquiry broad in scope, 
largely unlimited, either as to kind of information considered or the source 
from which it may come. . . . Consideration of a defendant’s past criminal 
history is appropriate when fashioning a sentence. A sentencing court 
may, with due caution, consider the existence of defendant’s alleged 
criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, or where charges 
have been dismissed.  
 
State v. Wickel, 126 Idaho 578, 580–81 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added). “Due 
caution” is not exercised when the district court believes the dismissed charge or 
uncharged conduct is the charged conduct. Dismissed charges or uncharged conduct 
must be considered and weighed with caution in comparison to the actual conduct for 
which the defendant pled guilty. Otherwise, the district court has the power to sentence 
the defendant not for the offense, but for whatever conduct it deems fit. This is the very 
definition of an abuse of discretion.  
In this case, the district court considered uncharged conduct to be the charged 
conduct. It did not exercise “due caution” in considering this conduct. The district court 
believed Mr. Elizondo caused injury to a child “choking her” and sentenced him 
accordingly. (Tr. Vol. II, p.20, Ls.5–11.) Moreover, the district court did not even discuss 
the dismissed charges or uncharged conduct at sentencing—likely because the facts of 
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this case were highly disputed. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.12–21, p.15, Ls.13–16.) 
Mr. Elizondo was sentenced for the wrong conduct, and the State has failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt this error did not contribute to the sentence imposed. Perry, 
150 Idaho at 221.  
Finally, Mr. Elizondo respectfully refers the Court to his arguments in his 
Appellant’s Brief on the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating circumstances. He maintains 
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give adequate weight to the 
mitigating factors in his case.3  
                                            
3 In a footnote, the State calls into question Mr. Elizondo’s acceptance of responsibility.  
The State notes that the presentence investigator did not believe Mr. Elizondo accepted 
responsibility for the crime. (Resp. Br., p.17 n.4 (citing PSI, p.13).)  
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Elizondo contested these unsupported opinions by 
the presentence investigator. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.5–p.8, L.3.) In response, the State 
provided, “I just leave that to the Court’s discretion. I think counsel’s objection is 
appropriate on his end, but I don’t know that it should be completely removed.” (Tr. Vol. 
II, p.8, Ls.6–9.) The district court then ruled, “I am not going to consider these 
statements.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.10–11; see also Tr. Vol. II, p.19, Ls.11–17.) Therefore, 
the State cannot rely on the presentence investigator’s opinions about Mr. Elizondo’s 
acceptance of responsibility. Those opinions were rejected by the district court.  
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Elizondo respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and 
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing before a different district judge, with 
instructions that the State recommend a sentence that strictly adheres to the plea 
agreement. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as 
it deems appropriate.  
 DATED this 1st day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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